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Handberg and Lowery: Lobbyists and the ERA

WOMEN STATE LEGISLATORS,
LOBBYISTS, AND THE
EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT
By Roger Handberg* and Wanda Lowery**
This study reports on female state legislators' perceptions of
the techniques used by lobbyists in the context of the struggle
over the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).I Female legislators
were chosen for examination because the ERA has presented a
particularly safient issue for politically active women;2 therefore,
these legislators have public positions on ERA. This fact permits
examination into several propositions found in political science
literature on legislator-lobbyist relations.
The primary proposition examined here is that pressure (or
interest) groups or individual constituents will contact supportive
or neutral legislators rather than known opponents. 3 At the same
• Professor of Political Science, University of Central Florida. B.A., Florida State
University, 1966; Ph.D., University of North Carolina, 1970.
•• Teacher, Brevard County (Florida). B.A., Florida Technological University, 1972;
M.P.P., Florida Technological University, 1977.
1. "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of sex." U.S. CaNST. proposed amend. XXVll, § 1.
2. The importance of ERA for female legislators is still high but for somewhat different reasons than in the past. The ERA ratification struggle, despite the time extension,
has run into trouble. Four states have passed rescission legislation, and the senates of two
more have moved for rescission. San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 16, 1979, at 41, col. 1. The
legislators interviewed for this study reported that tentative rescission efforts have also
occurred in at least fourteen other states. Thus, even in those states that have ratified
ERA, controversy over the issue in the legislatures has not subsided.
3. H. ZEIGLER & M. BAER, LOBBYING: INTERACTION AND INFLUENCE IN AMERICAN STATE
LEGISLATURES 130 (1969). The strategic calculation made is that contacting opponents is
both a waste of resources and ultimately counter-productive. An example of the latter
situation would be when a previously opposed but inactive legislator becomes actively
opposed because of the contacts by lobbyists. [d.
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time, we will look at the methods used by lobbyists to contact
opposing legislators. 4 Based on the existing literature,5 one would
expect that the predominant modes of contact would be relatively
impersonal, for example, letters and petitions. Personal contacts,
such as office visits, are less likely unless the legislator is neutral
or favorably predisposed toward the lobbyist's position. 6
The purpose of this study is to explore how the female
legislator-ERA lobbyist behavior compares to the usual
legislator-lobbyist pattern. 7
I. THE FEMALE LEGISLATOR: TARGET FOR ERA
LOBBYISTS

For obvious reasons related to political survival, legislators
are presumed to be relatively sensitive to constituency pressures. s
What usually occurs is that the legislator is approached by a
variety of groups who are interested in specific policy issues. 9

4. [d. at 176. And see, L. MILLBRATH, THE WASHINGTON LoBBYISTS 392-93 (1963).
5. D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 352-91 (1951).
6. M. JEWELL & S. PATTERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES, 279301 (3rd ed. 1977); L. RIEsELBACH, CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS 194-213 (1973).
7. Lobbyist-legislator interactions have been a recurrent focus of attention in the
legislative behavior literature. For a personalized view, see Katherine Hagen Sebo, On
Being a Woman in the North Carolina General Assembly (paper presented at the 1975
annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Nashville, Tenn.). Professor
Sebo was both a professor of political science and a North Carolina State Senator during
the ERA ratification struggle in 1975.
8. A legislator's sensitivity to constituency pressures as expressed by lobbyists has
been found to vary, depending upon the legislator's career aspirations and policy goals.
R. FENNo, HOME STYLE 171-213 (1978). The relationship, though, is not a simple one-toone linkage. In fact, one legislative role model, the "trustee," explicitly assumes that the
legislator does not always represent the constituency's short-run desires as expressed by
the lobbyist. The legislator can legitimately substitute his or her supposedly broader or
more reflective judgment for the moment's passions. J. WAHLKE, H. EULAu, W. BUCHANAN
& L. FERGUSON, THE LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM 267-86 (1962). Consistent with this view, the
legislators may perceive their constituents as having no coherent, expressed opinion on
most legislative matters. Some issues are selected by the legislator as having high interest
for the general population, but such issues tend to be relatively few.
9. Legislators are often confronted by very intense and emotional groups, but fortunately for the politician the groups are interested in a particular issue rather than a series
of issues. Therefore, the legislator can often deal with each issue separately, usually
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Although specific in content, the ERA represents a general issue
with high importance to various segments of the population.
Female legislators are important targets of pro- and antiERA lobbyists, not because they represent the decisive legislative
votes, but for other substantive and symbolic reasons. Substantively, the female legislators are in some states lO the floor leaders
for the ratification effort-a role apparently not sought by male
legislators. II In addition, the women provided an information
source for supportive male legislators, and served as a conduit for
further information from outside groups.· Symbolically, women
legislators are seen as important alternative role models for less
politically involved women. 12

II. RESULTS OF THE SURVEY
A.

CONFORMITY TO EXPECTED PATTERN

As a group, the women legislators who responded to our surveyl3 were heavily in favor of the amendment with seventy-two
without seriously offending other groups. These single issue groups are often unwilling to
tolerate compromise, because their issue agenda is so short. ld. at 301-02; R. FENNO, supra
note 8, at 157-60; Miller, Party Government and Saliency of Congress, 26 PuB. OPINION
Q. 542-43 (1962).
10. In Florida, the amendment was introduced each session by Senator Lori Wilson.
Senator Wilson was for the first half of her term the only woman in the Senate.
11. Although for some males their objections were apparently based upon symbolic
considerations. This interpretation of the male legislators' motivations was offered by
several women legislators involved in the study.
12. This symbolic function has a two-edged character to it in that women state
legislators have taken both pro-and anti-ERA stances.
13. The data used here consists of the responses of women state legislators to a mail
survey conducted during the summer of 1977. A list of all 688 women legislators in the
United States was obtained from the National Women's Education Fund. The return rate
for two mailings was 60%, for a total of 418 usable questionnaires. Comparatively speaking, state senators are over-represented in the sample return (73, or 71%) as opposed to
state representatives (333, or 57%). Two were returned from Nebraska, where the legislature is unicameral, while ten replies were unclassifiable.
The sample broke down as Democratic-61.7%, Republican-34.7%, and five respondents were either nonpartisan or independent in terms of party label. The respondents
were relatively inexperienced as legislators at the time of the survey. Twenty-nine percent
had less than a year's experience, while another twenty-two percent had served three years
or less. This general pattern reflects the 1974 election when a large number of Republican
incumbents were defeated in the aftermath of Watergate. This level of experience is fairly
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percent indicating ERA support and seventeen percent reporting
that they were opposed.1 4

In terms of lobbyist contacts, we looked first at the legislators' general exposure to the lobbying process l5 and then at
whether the lobbying efforts were congruent with the legislators'
views. We were concerned with the relative frequency with which
certain lobbying techniques were used to contact the legislator. 16
In conformity with earlier studies, the anti-ERA forces had
a pattern of using more impersonal modes of approach than their
pro-ERA counterparts. For example, personal visits, which are
the most direct, immediate approaches to the legislator, were the
method least used by anti-ERA lobbyists. Anti-ERA lobbyists
were reported as favoring the relatively impersonal mode of telegrams and letters, followed by telephone, petitions, public meetings, and personal visits.17 Pro-ERA lobbyists also preferred letters and telegrams, then telephone, public meetings, personal
typical of state legislatures, which are often characterized by high turnover. J. SCHLESINAMBmoN AND POLITICS (1966); Soule, Future Political Ambitions and the Behavior
of Incumbent State Legislators, 13 MIDWEST J. POLITICAL SCI. 439-54 (1969).
Demographically, the population reported here is overwhelmingly white collar and
self-employed (61%) (with the category of housewife next at 28.5%). This pattern contrasts
with an earlier sample in that the white collar groups have, in terms of percentage, almost
doubled.!. DIAMOND, SEX RoLES IN THE STATE HOUSE 177 (1977). In contrast to another
study, most of the women here report an occupation other than housewife before election
to the legislature. See, e.g., J. KiRKPATRICK, POLITICAL WOMAN 61 (1974). Educationally,
the legislators identified here are college graduates with some graduate work (67.3%). This
group compares favorably to the Kirkpatrick study which found that most women state
legislators had an under-utilized college education. Id. at 29. In addition, the legislators
identified here are younger as a group than Diamond's earlier regional sample. The change
in the age distribution occurs in the oldest and youngest categories. Nearly twice (23%)
as many occur in the 21-39 year group as Diamond reported (12%) while in the 60-69 year
group, the results are 11% to Diamond's 26%. One can hypothesize several alternative
explanations for this shift in the pattern; i.e., changing fertility patterns, increased political career motivations among younger aspirants, or increased difficulty of electoral competition for older candidates.!. DIAMOND, supra at 177.
14. The relatively small number of identifiable opponents (there were 55) limits
analysis somewhat but still allows certain conclusions. Analysis of several alternative
hypotheses is precluded because of the attenuation of the sample which occurs when
controls are used, because the number of legislators in a particular subcategory is fewer
than five.
15. H. ZEIGLER & M. BAER, supra note 3, at 176. Much of the information in the area
is derived from studies done on congressional constituent contacts.
16. This ranking is based on reporting by the legislator. Each legislator was asked to
rank various methods from most frequent to least frequent-a total of five categories.
17. The percentages were: telegrams and letters, 68.2%; telephone, 34.9%; petitions,
20.1%; public meetings, 10.8%; and personal visits, 10.3%.
GER,
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visits, and petitions. ls Since most of the female legislators are proERA it is not surprising that pro-ERA lobbyists had a much
greater preference for personal visits than their anti-ERA counterparts. 19
The hypothesis that the legislators are confronted primarily
with supportive lobbyist activities, because opponents to the
views of the legislators save their energies and resources for more
productive areas,20 was upheld in this study. What is apparent is
a polar distribution of pro-ERA legislators predominantly seeing
pro-ERA lobbyists with anti-ERA legislators predominantly
seeing anti-ERA lobbyists. 21 For example, over three quarters
(76%) of our pro-ERA legislators reported that they predominantly saw pro-ERA lobbyists. Conversely, anti-ERA legislators
reported that they overwhelmingly (90%) saw anti-ERA lobbyists. When the lobbyists were separated by sex, the pattern did
not change. Given that the hypothesis' of ideological conformity
was upheld, we then shifted our analytic focus to consider
whether differences occurred in the type of lobbyist contact received by pro- and anti-ERA women legislators.
B.

VARIATIONS FROM THE EXPECTED PATrERN

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the pattern of lobbyist behavior as
seen by the two contrasting sets of legislators. Table 1 concerns
activities by anti-ERA lobbyists while Table 2 covers pro-ERA
lobbyists' activities. The first column represents the percentage
of pro-ERA legislators who ranked the particular activity as either first or second. The second presents the distribution of antiERA legislators who made the same evaluation. 22
18. The percentages were: telegrams and letters, 61.5%; telephone, 39.8%; public
meetings, 19.3%; personal visits, 18.5%; and petitions, 9.9%.
19. 18.5% as against 10.3%.
20. H. ZEIGLER & M. BAER, supra note 3.
21. Anti-ERA legislators, in fact, reported the greatest cross pressures from lobbyists
opposed to their personal policy views. Given that the data is reported by the legislator,
some misinformation may occur, but what is impressive is the direction and strength of
the relationship.
22. Both evaluation patterns are based upon the perceptions of the legislators; we
have no empirical evidence to validate the rankings within the particular state or even at
the national level. This does not invalidate the results, but is introduced as a caution.
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TABLE 1
ANTI-ERA LOBBYISTS

Legislator View of ERA

Lobbyist
Activities
Visits

Favor

Oppose

5.8%

20.5%

N =246
x:! = 14.04, P = .02

gamma = - .228
Cramer's V = .239
Telephone
Calls

11.7%

13.9%

N =266
x:! = 6.651, P = .248

gamma = - .264
Cramer's V == .158
Letters

70.6%

53.2%

N= 312
== 12.06, P = .027
gamma = .292
Cramer's V == .201

x2

Petitions

8.4%

5.4%

N=240
== 15.363, P = .001
gamma == .447
Cramer's V = .253
x:!

Public
Meetings

6.1%

11.1%

N

== 234

== 5.909, p == .315
gamma == - .122
Cramer's V == .159

x2

In terms of anti-ERA lobbyist activity, the major differences
between the two sets of legislators occurred in the category of
personal visits. The expected pattern is for anti-ERA lobbyists to
interact most actively on a personal basis with anti-ERA legislators, because visits involve a degree of personal interaction which
can· prove stressful for persons opposed to the other's known
views. Conversely, the more impersonal forms of behavior (letters
and petitions) would be expected to be addressed to pro-ERA
legislators. This separation process would allow one to lobby one's
legislature but at a reduced psychic cost to both the legislator and
the lobbyist. 23 The aggregate pattern in Table 1 supports that line
of reasoning. Anti-ERA lobbyists were clearly more active in personally approaching those legislators who at some level supported
the lobbyists' views.
23. One study related the stress experienced by some lt~gislators when confronting
hostile (or unknown) constituents. The legislators tried to minimize the potentially stressful contact..R. FENNo, supra note 8, at 131.
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TABLE 2
PRo-ERA LOBBYISTS
Legislator View of ERA

Lobbyist
Activities
Visits

Favo1'

Oppose

11.90

13.5'!t

N

=

2lj6

x:! = 3.22, Jl = .6tili

=

gamma
.005
Cramer's V
.112
Calls

16.5'!t

11.40

N=274
4.61, P
.465
gamma
.035
Cramer's V
.130
x:!

Letters

.16.7~~

=

N

=

=

=

=

= 299

x:! = 12.827, P = .0~5

gamma = .261
Cramer's V
.207

=

Petitions

1.9'1<

11.80.

N= 240
11.177, p = .048
gamma = .041
Cramer's V = .215

x:!

Public
Meetings

14.0%

22.9'!t

=

= 256
gamma = N

x:! = 5.744, p = .332

Cramer's V

.174
.15(}

=

When the focus shifts to the activities of the pro-ERA constituents, the pattern becomes more ambiguous. Pro-ERA lobbyists interacted more directly through visits with legislators regardless of the legislators' personal views. Those lobbyists were
apparently more likely to call on anti-ERA legislators than pro:
ERA legislators. What makes the pattern interesting is that except for phone calls, pro-ERA lobbyists were more prone to contact anti-ERA legislators in personalized ways than the theory
would predict. In terms of the more impersonal forms oflobbying,
the pattern for petitions is the opposite of that expected.
Explaining this behavior pattern is somewhat difficult since
the particular data collection procedure is such that returning to
the respondents is impossible. More important, the legislators
were reporting their impressions of the activities of others whose
strategic calculations can only be inferred. Nevertheless, a possible explanation is that pro-ERA lobbyists felt some necessity to
develop or maintain what might be termed women's solidarity.
That is, in the battle over ERA ratification or rescission, the

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1978

7

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 9

616

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:609

existence of anti-ERA female legislators is an embarrassment.
ERA has been defined by many in the women's movement as a
symbol of their fight for equality. Female legislators opposed to
ERA become more than just a vote; they are a counter symbol.
For example, at the time of the passage of the Civil Rights Act,
no Black member of Congress opposed the bills. On that issue,
the solidarity of the Black community was clear. By contrast,
anti-ERA female legislators expose by their very existence the
schisms within the women's movement. Therefore, in a counterpoint to the politics of the usual, the pro-ERA lobbyists actively
pursued in a personal way legislators opposed to their policy position. Very likely the symbolic nature of the issue raised is above
the context of normal politics. For the anti-ERA lobbyists, the
symbolic overtones inherent in the situation were less relevant,
because their concern was with total votes. For them, male legislators, not errant female legislators, were more important.
ID.

CONCLUSION

The literature on legislator-lobbyist relations has concluded
that like-minded talk to like-minded. Much of the contact with
the legislator is through such impersonal sources that its ultimate
impact is difficult to gauge. In the struggle over ERA the pattern
holds, in that pro-ERA legislators interact more frequently with
pro-ERA lobbyists, and anti-ERA legislators do the same with
anti-ERA lobbyists. The major anomaly of the study occurs when
one looks at the relationship between anti-ERA legislators and
pro-ERA lobbyists. The usual pattern does not hold. The explanation suggested here was premised upon the symbolic importance
of female state legislators. A defmitive answer can come only
through systematic study of the ERA lobbying process. As a
group, female legislators will not hold the decisive votes in determining whether ERA is ratified, but they do represent an excellent example of how the usual patterns of group-based politics do
not always hold.
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